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Abstract—Security of software systems is of general concern,
yet breaches caused by common vulnerabilities still occur. Soft-
ware developers are routinely called upon to ”do more” to
address this situation. However there has been little focus on
the developers’ point of view, and understanding how security
features in their day-to-day activities. This paper reports pre-
liminary findings of semi-structured interviews taken during an
ethnographic study of professional software developers in one
organization who are not security experts. The overall study
aims to understand how security features in day-to-day practice,
while analysis of the interview data asks whether developers
are responsible for security. The study reveals that awareness
around security matters is raised through several paths including
processes, standards, practices and company training and that
a focus on security is driven by contextual factors. Security
is taken care of with policies and through safeguards, and is
handled differently depending on whether a team is developing
new features, and hence ”looking forward”, or working with
existing code and hence ”looking back”. Developers take and
share responsibility for security in the code, but suggest that
their responsibility has limits, and relies on collective practice.
Index Terms—secure software development, collaborative en-
vironments, empirical studies
I. INTRODUCTION
Are developers responsible for security? Several of the
breaches reported in recent years question the role of devel-
opers in keeping software systems secure. A look at media
sources makes it clear that there are many views about what
developers should be doing about security. Developers should
be security champions, the “first line of defense” [1]; they are
increasingly responsible for security, but shouldn’t be [2]; both
development and security departments should take responsi-
bility for application security [3], and at the most extreme,
developers should be liable for code with vulnerabilities [4].
This is an amplified portrayal of application security cover-
age in the media, but it should be noted that the claims made
are often grounded in established principles. It is possible to
build security in from the start by integrating operations tools
and staff with developers and security experts . For example,
DevSecOps integrates security controls and processes into the
DevOps software development cycle [5]. Like DevOps [6], De-
vSecOps has a reliance on operational tools, established agile
engineering practices and the right culture of collaboration [7].
It is also possible to consider security at all phases of the
development process, as in secure-by-design approaches [8],
[9]. One objective of these approaches is to ensure that
software architectures have appropriate security features, by
integrating appropriate elements of best practice that address
relevant threats (e.g., OWASP Top 10 List [10]).
The sources touch on another valid point. Many software
developers do not consistently and comprehensively make
use of security practices and technologies, raising questions
about what else might be going on. It may be true that
“good” security requires effort by developers at every step
in the process. However, it may be that security in software
development is also driven by intrinsic factors that can be
supported through social interactions in the community and
culture of software development.
To investigate this possibility, the Motivating Jenny project1
is conducting a series of ethnographic studies that build upon
frameworks of personal motivation and team culture [11]–[13],
to understand more about how professional developers can be
motivated to adopt security coding practices. This paper gives
a preliminary account about the responsibility developers feel
toward writing secure software, based on a set of interviews
conducted as part of one such ethnographic study.
II. BACKGROUND
Security has been described as a secondary concern to de-
velopers, one that must be prioritized and managed alongside
other tasks developers need to complete [14]. However, the
stakes in security are high. Security related errors made by
developers can be costly, they can endanger all those who rely
on the software they build [15]. One problem is that developers
rarely need to use security techniques such as cryptography
in their software, and when they do, the APIs are difficult
to use [16]. Guidance in online sources used by developers
is not comprehensive or robust [17], and often not correct
[18]. Activities designed to raise awareness are perceived by
developers to be helpful, but may not have lasting impact on
teams [19].
Within software engineering, security is commonly consid-
ered in terms of a particular mindset [20]. Engineers are often
encouraged to adopt the attacker mindset, in terms of the ill
intent or aims that other people might have toward the system
they are building, and how an attacker might try to gain access
1https://www.motivatingjenny.org
to the system or what an attacker might do when they have
access to it [21]. Security can also be considered using the
defender mindset, in terms of knowing weaknesses or flaws
in software that might make it easier for attacks to take place.
It considers how prevalent weaknesses are, and how easy they
will be to find and mitigate [10]. Both approaches include
valid and useful techniques, however they place the developer
in defensive or offensive roles, positions that do not support
this project’s aim to understand what developers think about
security, about their interest in writing secure code or how
important they believe secure code is.
Rather than using negative and confrontational constructs,
it is possible to think of security in positive terms [22], to
consider security as a quality to be striven for rather than to
be feared, a “property of the social world” [23], that reflects
shared values about what is important [24].
This approach has corollaries in computing. In the current
moment, keeping sight of the underlying ethics and fairness
that drive technology initiatives is a primary concern [25].
Efforts are underway to find ways to empirically measure
values in software [26]. Value sensitive design methods have
arisen to help designers account for and support human values
in technology products [27].
The emphasis on values is key. It acknowledges that making
technology is a social process [13], and should result in
technologies that reflect what people think is important [28]. In
the same way, considering security with a value oriented lens
may offer developers a way to advocate for what they believe
is important in their work, a point that has connections with
research in software engineering motivation [29].
III. CASE DESCRIPTION
The case focuses on a global software company that spe-
cializes in workforce management software. Specifically, this
study engaged with one organization within this parent com-
pany, based in the South East of England. This organization
consists of about 100 people with around 40 of those being
formed into software development teams that use Scrum-
based Agile practices (a further 16 engineers who work with
those based in this office are located overseas). Each team
is assigned a scrum master and one or two product owners;
each scrum master and product owner may be associated with
one or more teams. In addition, there is one user interface
specialist, one UX specialist and a technical author who are
spread across the teams. All teams follow a release cycle of 8
weeks in which 3 sprints of 2 weeks each are focused on the
product backlog, and the final sprint (i.e. the last 2 weeks) is
mostly devoted to making fixes and regression testing.
The case organization was an independent company until
mid 2016, when it joined the parent company based in the
US. This parent company has a specialist security function
and employs a Chief Information Security and Privacy Officer.
In the case organization, there is one principal software
engineer who takes a key role in network and architecture
security, and one technical product owner, who takes the lead
locally on a range of security-related matters, including GDPR.
The organization uses a service called Qualys which runs
automated tests against the software to identify issues that
appear in the OWASP top ten list; this is done weekly. If issues
are found, then depending on their severity, technical stories
are generated and either actioned immediately or added into
the relevant backlog. The organization also uses an external
penetration testing service. External penetration testers are
given information about the system and access to the code
and then asked to identify vulnerabilities.
The second author had studied the organization in the recent
past, and so the organization was known to the research
team. However, previous studies were not related to security
practices.
IV. METHOD
The ethnographic method is used to study peoples’ actions
and accounts of actions. The method allows researchers to
develop understanding about what practitioners working in
socio-technical environments do and why they do it [30].
Ethnography permits researchers to consider experience from
the perspective of the insider [30]. In this study, the aim
is to understand the point-of-view that professional software
developers have about security.
Ethnographic studies play a number of roles in empirical
software engineering [30]. They can inform the design of
software engineering tools and improve process development.
This analysis intends to strengthen investigations into the
social and human aspects of software engineering, and to assist
in the exploration and refinement of the research question
guiding the larger study, which asks:
How does security feature in developers’ day-to-day
practice within a non-specialist context?
Analysis in ethnographic studies often includes exploration
of other open-ended questions that signal problems or provoke
a sense of unease [31]. The account given here represents
an analysis of this kind, by considering a subset of the data
collected in light of the question that opened the paper:
Are developers responsible for security?
A. Data collection
The study was planned before data collection began within
two initial meetings and several email exchanges. Data were
collected at three different points in time.
The first period involved observation and informal inter-
views across the first sprint of a new release cycle. Three
teams were observed, each with between 3 and 8 developers
and testers, plus their scrum masters and product owners. The
observations were driven by the activity of the developers in
the team, but were focused on daily rhythms, and on un-
covering security-related activities in daily work. During this
period, contextual interviews were also undertaken with the
Vice President of product development, the technical product
TABLE I
SECURITY-RELATED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Q1. Does security come up often in your work? - What needs to be
secured? Or Who?
Q2. What is doing the securing?
Q3. Why is [the subject] being secured?
Q4. Who (or what) is [the subject] being secured from?
Q5. When did you start spending more time on security issues? - What
caused this change?
Q6. How do you keep up with security technologies?
Q7. Do you feel you could/want to do more about security? - What
kind of support would you need?
Q8. Do security measures get in your way? What do you do about it?
owner and the security officer from the parent company. The
final set of data was collected during a workshop and feedback
session.
Data collected in the first and third parts of the study were
used to provide context for the account reported here, but are
not reported in detail. These data included observation and
meeting notes, physical layout sketches, screen captures of the
software artefacts used, still photographs, audio recordings of
interviews and meetings, and development artefacts such as
wiki pages, user stories and exported data from chat software.
The second period of the study forms the basis of reporting
in this paper. In this part, semi-structured interviews were
conducted with 13 developers, testers and technical managers
from the teams that had been observed. Interviews were
conducted by two of the researchers who also performed
observations.
The development of the interview script for this part was
informed by the preceding observation work, and other parallel
project activities. Prior observations had taken place during
everyday practice. Though a few instances of practice were
observed that included security elements, this interview was
the first time developers at this company were directly asked
about security.
The interviews included questions of two types. The first set
of questions, which are not reported here, examined aspects
of the interviewee’s career, drawing on theory related to
motivation [32] [12]. The last portion of each interview was
spent discussing the interviewee’s attitudes and beliefs about
security and secure software development in the organization.
Taking the view that security is a quality to be striven for,
a set of eight baseline questions were defined to guide the
interview, which were modified to suit circumstances with
individual informants (Table I). In some cases, fewer than 8
questions were asked, in other cases as many as 17 questions
were asked to probe for detail or to clarify particular points.
The ordering of questions was not consistent; questions were
asked in the sequence that made sense for the interaction.
B. Data Analysis
Analysis in ethnographic research begins at the point of
collection as researchers formulate ideas about the significance
of what was seen, and new questions arise about what else
might need to be examined to answer the research question.
The meanings formed in analysis must be forged through
writing [33]: of field notes, transcriptions, descriptions and,
ultimately, the accounts.
In this study, field work was discussed by the researchers,
field notes were taken and key findings shared. From this
overall contextual view, a subset of interview data were se-
lected for analysis to develop a preliminary series of accounts
relating to security themes. The analysis did not conform to
one particular theoretical underpinning, but was informed by
the various theoretical frameworks introduced in section II
above.
Analysis proceeded in an iterative, inductive fashion, taking
into account observations of the organization and developers’
daily work practices. The purpose of the analysis has been to
better understand the relationship between responsibility for
security and software developers.
The analytic process was performed on interviews taken
by one of the two interviewers. This researcher conducted 7
interviews over the course of three days with one software
development manager, 5 developers and 1 tester from the
teams that had been observed during the first week of the
study.
The audio recording of each interview was transcribed and
then examined to find themes [34] using the following steps:
1) Each interview response was segmented into meaningful
units. Three categories of information were considered:
a) A response or portion of a response that cor-
responded directly to a question from the basic
schedule of eight — these represented the broad
themes under examination.
b) Factual or contextual information about operations
or policies at the company.
c) Information revealing a personal attitude or belief
held by an interviewee.
2) The meaningful units for each interview were printed
onto sheets of paper, cut into individual pieces and
grouped together into sets to reflect the categories of
information noted above. As Figure 1 shows, this was
not an exhaustive process; the primary aim was to collate
responses from different informants into related groups
to facilitate comparison.
3) In the last stage of analysis, responses in each grouping
were examined together to refine a set of categories and
themes for reporting.
V. FINDINGS
In the rest of this paper, a preliminary account is given
that provides insight into perceptions developers have about
security in this environment. Some themes closely reflect
questions that were asked, while others emerged out of the
Fig. 1. Interview responses grouped into categories
data when they were examined. In bringing together responses
from different informants, the findings indicate a synthesis
and situated definition. They reflect views about this particular
environment, in the period during which data were collected.
An overview of the people whose interviews were anal-
ysed for this section is given in Table II, represented with
pseudonyms. In the following sections, findings are presented
with anonymous quotes given by these individuals; in cases
of longer quotes, a pseudonym is referenced.
A. Context and Environment
Agile software development practices have been used by this
organization for over five years. The teams studied are ‘typical’
of agile software development [35]. Each team followed a
standard agile rhythm, beginning the day with a standup, and
punctuating the day with code reviews, backlog grooming ses-
sions and ad hoc team member conversations. Conversations
are open, there is talk between individuals and between teams,
with developers joining in to help others when needed. Daily
stand-ups took place around the physical boards, indicated on
the floorplan in Figure 2. The teams used a physical Kanban-
style board for keeping track of work during standups, and an
on-line system, Jira, to maintain all data.
The development teams are located primarily in one area
of one floor of the building (see Fig 2). Some developers are
located remotely, and are interacted with via videoconferenc-
ing or instant messaging, either as part of a planned meeting
or ad hoc when needed. There are two meeting rooms and
several breakout areas on the same floor, and further meeting
rooms on the floor below. These are used for stand-ups, sprint
planning meetings, retrospectives and other team and customer
Fig. 2. Software development area. Note that this is indicative only, and not
to scale
meetings. Five teams are located in the software development
area (see Fig 2). The three teams that were the focus of this
study, and from whom the interviewees primarily came, are
profiled below.
1) Oak: Oak is one of three teams that add features to
the core products. They also undertake work to maintain and
improve codebases written in PHP, Javascript and C#. The
team includes five engineers, three of whom are senior, and
two testers. This team, recently formed, is proving strong,
but the mix of experience and approaches can raise tensions
between less experienced members who have a lot of “fun,
new ideas”, and those who have been in the profession for a
long time, and prefer to use proven ways.
2) Elm: Elm is responsible for the company’s mobile
applications, written in Ruby and AngularJS. Recently, the
team has also taken up some work in PHP to independently
handle their integration with the core product set. Currently,
the team has four members: three engineers and one tester.
The lead engineer and tester have longstanding experience in
the company; the lead engineer has come in and out of this
team once or twice. One of the other engineers is more junior,
recently brought over from a different team to take up work
on the interface. A third engineer works remotely in a shared
office space in a different country.
3) Beech: Beech is in charge of business intelligence. In
this capacity, the team uses third-party reporting tools such as
Talend and Juniper to write reports out of data produced by
the core products. Recently, this bespoke reporting process has
been migrated into a product that customers can incorporate
into their own reporting systems. The team has three senior
engineers, and access to a tester working remotely in India.
The seniority of the engineers can make discussions tricky
TABLE II
INTERVIEWEE DEMOGRAPHICS
Identifier/role Age Years of
experi-
ence
Years at
ORG
Team
Oscar (SE) 24 1 1 Oak
John (Lead SE) 45 20 20 Elm
Ned (Senior SE) 46 13 1 Beech
Jacob (Lead SE) 29 10+ 3 Oak
Ben (Software
Development
Mgr)
32 12 4 n/a
Frank (Tester) 40 17 17 Elm
Edmond (Senior
SE)
67 45 17+ Oak
because everyone has strong opinions. But it also has a positive
effect - the solutions are perceived by team members to be of
high quality.
B. Developing Awareness
Workers develop awareness about security on the job and
through engagement with the wider world [36]. In this envi-
ronment, there was clear recognition among engineers of the
importance of security for customers, and for the organization.
Interviewees indicated an awareness of the need to avoid “rep-
utational damage”, and to meet the requirements of customers
who “expect their data to be secure”.
These impressions may have been formed, in part, by
training about information security provided by the company.
All employees at the organization are required to watch a
security training video each year that includes a quiz. The
video explains what kinds of information shouldn’t be dis-
closed outside of the company, and how employees should
manage data for clients on their laptop machines, or when
using external storage devices. It also explains how employees
can responsibly leave their computers unattended, and how to
responsibly post and send information through email.
Interviewees showed varying levels of awareness of security
matters within the software. Awareness is heightened in the
environment among the engineering teams in five ways.
1) Audits or other compliance mechanisms like GDPR
which can expose potential weaknesses in code, or issues
that they had “never thought about”.
2) Security scanning reports from a static analysis tool that
generates automated pen-testing reports. Outputs from
these reports are fed into code reviews.
3) Internal review processes, like code reviews. These can
highlight that something was “missed” in, for exam-
ple an authentication process, that will in turn trigger
changes in the code, and may prompt changes to legacy
code.
4) Internally documented standards about how secure code
should be written. These were observed to have been re-
cently added to the wiki by one engineer who remarked
that these were prompting more discussion about the
topic.
5) Reading others’ code. Seeing security implementations
in the code raises awareness that security measures have
been taken, but not complete understanding of how they
work.
C. Contextual Drivers
Awareness is only the “first step” [37] to secure systems.
Workers also must engage with security [38], and they must
take it up in practice.
Security was described by most of the interviewees as not
being a top priority for the teams, as something that doesn’t
come up very often or only occasionally. Although security
seems to be becoming a more common point of discussion,
it remains a “minor aspect” of what the engineers do and is
not at the “forefront of any decisions” that are made. Security
was described in one or two cases as being something that
people deal with a lot or frequently. The explanation for the
difference in these two perspectives isn’t clear.
During the period of this study, security at the organization
was not perceived by the engineers to be in the hands of a
single person. One developer explained that it was not “like an
email” or a directive had been sent telling the developers that
they need to look at security. Instead, security development
was perceived to be event-driven. In the recent past, for
example, the engineers made a number of security related
changes in the code in response to a drive initiated by the sales
department to meet the requirements of an audit. In cases like
this, the need to comply with an external requirement triggers
a process in the teams that produces a list of things that need
to be “sorted out” in the code. This happens on an intermittent
basis.
The engineers also observed that reports from the static
analysis tool can prompt secure coding activity from time to
time. One interviewee hadn’t noticed anything coming from
the static analysis tool vulnerability report in “quite a while”.
As he noted, this did not mean that issues were not being
raised by the system, only that the issues may have been
passed to other teams. This perception was confirmed by the
technical Product Owner, who noted that the tool had not
recently identified actionable security issues.
D. Handling Security
System security engineering refers to the software and hard-
ware development life-cycle and includes a range of activities,
including architecture design, code implementation, analysis
of economic incentives and human psychology, as well as
policy and assurance [39]. Security is handled differently by
different teams in the organization. For teams building new
features, security is considered “going forward”, by looking at
what is going into code, and checking it over in code reviews.
That is the moment when the team as a whole says “these are
the things we should and should not be doing”. For teams that
look after existing code, security is and will be about looking
back, seeing what is currently there and trying to improve it.
Another engineer noted that security is a consideration
when design is happening, when sprints are planned or when
stories are tasked. That is the point at which assumptions are
checked, and discussion is had about extra precautions that
might need to be taken. However, this view wasn’t shared by
other engineers, and may represent desired, rather than actual,
practice [31].
Recently, different safeguards have been put in place. Some
of these measures were introduced by the company, while
others were initiated within application frameworks:
1) Securing URLs and passwords. This has involved
stronger encryption of passwords, and use of encryption
on laptops, in other hardware and on the network.
2) Introducing access logging, now that we are in “GDPR
age”, to make sure that if changes are made to records,
it is possible to track when and by whom the changes
were made.
3) Securing access within the applications by making sure
that users see what they are “supposed” to see. This
also entails making sure that when a customer submits
a form, it is not possible to just go into the form
and change a variable and actually now make it affect
someone else.
E. (Deliberate) Reliance on Others
One way the engineers ensure that code is secure is by
relying on security features within the technologies. As they
put it, “everything is already within the application”, the code
is already within ”layers of security”. Security controls are
built into the databases, the network, and API endpoints,
allowing the developers to “piggyback” on rules for access that
have been defined and are controlled by clients. The developers
thus give most of their time and attention to extending and
developing the products, while relying on the “security stuff”
already put into place to handle security.
This is not an entirely passive process. It is also deliberate.
Engineers indicated that relying on existing code is something
they must actively do. For example, the application framework
has a built-in permission system. However, it is up to the
engineers to “make sure” that the system is used when new
pages are added to the product.
Indications are also given that colleagues provide support
for security coding to one another in a number of ways,
including through existing implementations in the code and
in discussion during code reviews. When barriers to practice
arise, for example in configuring SSH keys, engineers were
observed to provide ad hoc information to one another to help
work move along. Edmond explained the support in this way:
“[N]ormally there is someone you can [go] to and
say well look I need to set this up. Can you tell me
how?”
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Threats to validity relating to this study have been compiled
using Runeson et al’s guidelines [40].
Internal validity The main threat to internal validity is that
the data collected be misunderstood or misinterpreted, or that
the interview questions be misunderstood by the interviewees.
The interviews were conducted by experienced researchers,
and the interview protocol allowed for concepts and issues to
be explored thereby confirming joint understanding. The find-
ings of this study have also been presented to and discussed
with the study participants in order to check interpretation.
Construct validity A key purpose of the study was to
understand the participants’ views of security. The constructs
were therefore coming from the participants and not imposed
by the researchers. Existing literature on security and its
relationship to developers was examined to mitigate this threat.
Reliability In an ethnographic study, the researcher is the
instrument and in that sense, the results are dependent on the
researcher involved. However, this study was not undertaken
by a sole researcher, and two of those collecting data are
experienced researchers in ethnographic software development
studies. With the same focus and the same exposure to the
organization, it is reasonable to expect that similar results
would emerge.
External validity This study focuses on one organization.
This limits the extent to which the conclusions presented here
can be generalized. However, this organization operates in a
similar fashion to other agile software development teams, in
terms of practices, tools, and daily rhythms.
Generalization can be achieved through analogy (analogic
generalization) and explanation (abductive inference). Analog-
ical generalization takes a situation that has similar characteris-
tics to the one studied and discusses whether the circumstances
are similar enough to allow the conclusions to be applied to
that situation. In this case it would require the circumstances
of a different team to be characterized and the applicability
of these findings to be discussed. With abductive inference,
an explanation of activity can help support analogic gener-
alization. The explanations of the studied team, provided in
previous sections, gives information to explore whether the
findings can be applied to another team [41].
VII. DISCUSSION
The engineers shared the view that this organization is
taking data protection for their clients seriously. On this point,
one engineer was very positive, explaining that he didn’t feel a
need to advocate for data protection because the “information
governance” at the company is stronger than it was in a prior
field in which he had worked. There, he described the attitude
taken as “laissez-faire” at best.
Yet, the belief was widely held that more could be done, that
there is an “occasional lack of attention” or “lacking areas”.
Sometimes the lack was linked to individual knowledge or
experience in the sense that “what you don’t know, you don’t
know”, but also to a lack of structure in how security related
issues are currently handled. Though processes designed to be
secure are being initiated by a security specialist in the parent
company, there was a degree of skepticism conveyed about
whether or not it would be possible to ensure in anyway that
the safeguards were working.
The sense was also given that the engineers do not have a
clear way to assess what “enough security” is. Security can
be “good enough” at a point in time, but that may just be
luck. Likewise, there was the sense conveyed that more could
always be done. This particular observation was not couched
in terms of how things are done at this particular organization,
but more generally in terms of the nature of security in the
context of software development.
In the main, however, the engineers believe that they are
making efforts around security and doing pretty well. John
mentioned that the team “would like to think that we are
producing secure software” and hopefully “we mostly are.”
He conceded, however, that things are sometimes brought to
the attention of the engineers during code reviews or by audits:
“[W]e do miss things. And the security audits come
along and expose some things that we have missed.
Or sometimes they might expose a whole class of
things that we’ve just never thought about and that
causes a bit more of a severe issue.”
A. Are developers responsible for security?
The engineers and testers in this environment do feel a
responsibility toward making sure that the code they write
and test is secure. Echoing views given in the introduction,
interviewees commented that they should always bear security
in mind. As Jacob described:
“It should be there at every stage. So we should be
thinking about it when we’re grooming, we should
be thinking about it when we are reviewing code.
And then after that, we should be thinking about it
when we are testing code”.
However, while the need for security was asserted, the
responsibility for upholding it was also perceived to be shared
with other members of the teams. As an addendum to his
comment, Jacob noted that testers might already be looking
for vulnerabilities, but he didn’t know. The developers rely
on security features written by other team members. These
examples in the code are used to develop security awareness,
but also to foster assurance within and among the engineers
about making the code secure. The rationale given was that the
software will be secure if “you do [it] in a way that everybody
else does it”.
Likewise, indications were given that the engineering teams
may not always feel ownership of security. Decisions about
security measures to take have been made for the application
frameworks, databases and networks. Several interviewees
suggested that the principal software engineer had a role in
these decisions, and knows more about security than the other
engineers. As one interviewee explained, ”I’ve delegated that
responsibility to [the principal software engineer]”. This was
a position which he acknowledged was a ”get out” but also
defended as being prudent, because this person is, if not a
security specialist, more “specialised” and has looked at the
problem of security in more detail.
This group of engineers believes the software they write is
secure because they use security features within the technolo-
gies, and develop understanding among themselves about how
to employ them and to ensure that they are properly used. They
also follow a set of procedures and internally documented
standards that they have been asked to use, by the principal
software engineer or by the organization.
Suggestions were also made that responsibility for the
security of the product lies, in the end, with the organization.
The business is responsible for ensuring that the data it handles
for clients isn’t “prone to being nicked” and for vetting the
security landscape of vendors the company uses for things like
data storage.
Even here, however, the perception was held that the limits
of responsibility toward security go beyond the organization.
As Ned explained, security is put in place to keep honest peo-
ple honest. But security won’t keep determined, or dishonest,
people out:
“If someone is determined, they will get into our sys-
tems either by a brute force attack, a technological
attack, or by socially engineering a situation where
they can actually get in through a back door. They
find what they want, and they take it.”
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study looked at the beliefs and perceptions of software
engineers at one organization. The engineers had a broad
range of levels of experience and roles. The organization is
taking security seriously by introducing safeguards, policies
and measures to provide security assurance. Likewise, the
engineering teams take collective responsibility for security
in the code they write and and test. They accept measures
brought into the organization, and use events like audits to
build knowledge and improve the code. They believe that
the code they are writing is mostly secure, but they feel that
improvements can still be made.
Developers do feel a responsibility toward security. The
views of developers from this organization indicate a prag-
matic approach toward secure coding practice that has recog-
nized limits and boundaries. Policies, technical environments,
infrastructure and social aspects of practice provide security
assurance to some degree. Combined with the experience and
skills of practitioners, security measures produce software
systems that are arguably “mostly secure”, a view tempered by
the understanding that responsibility for security is ongoing,
shared among roles within the organization and beyond.
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